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PLEADING.*
In every orderly system of justice a trial should be preceded
by some formulation of the question in dispute between the
parties. An intelligent presentation of the case requires that
each party be informed of his, adversary's contentions. Before
the court can proceed to judgment it must be informed of the na-
ture of the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's defense. At com-.
mon law the presentation of these facts constitutes the art of
pleading, a part of procedure or remedial law.
Most controversies that end in a suit at law are first pre-
sented by the disputants in the form of a confused mass of facts,
relevant and irrevelant, and to arrive at the true point for dis-
cussion and decision it is necessary in some manner to decide on
and extract the basic point in dispute. This is particularly neces-
sary in systems where the finding of the facts is delegated to a
person or persons other than the magistrate before whom the
proceedings are instituted. So it was at one famous period of
the Ronian law when the magistrate (prwtor), after hearing the
claims of both parties, drew up-a brief document (formula), con.
taining instructions to the official referee or arbiter (jude.r),
as to the points in dispute and the decision to be i-endered in
accordance with the facts as proved. Under modern continen-
tal systems whose procedure is modeled on later Roman law, and
the Canon law, where facts and law are both for the judge, the'
parties are usually allowed to make their statements at length
with no view to arriving at the precise question to be adjudicated.
These statements are then examined and sffted by counsel or
judge and the nature of the controversy determined. The method
of the English common law, on the other hand, is to compel the
parties, in advance of the trial, by alternate allegations so to
plead as to develop some single point affirmed on the one side
and denied on the other, and to agree upon this question as the
one that should determine the cause. The point so selected for
*Introductory note to a selection of cases on pleading. All rights re-
served.
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decision is called the issue, the exitus or outcome of the plead-
ings.1
The obscure beginnings of this system must be looked for
in the remote past when man's conception of a trial was limited
to ordeals and oaths. The plaintiff with his secta made his plaint,
the defendant made denial and the court gave judgment by award-
ing to one or the other party the right of going-to the proof in
one of the ways known to the law.2 In Anglo-Saxon and early
Norman times the plaintiff stated his case on oath in the words
prescribed by ancient usage. Legal process was an innovation
upon the right of private redress and no greater benefit could
be obtained by seeking the assistance of a court than the law ex-
pressly conferred; the defendant could take advantage of the
slightest flaw or misrecital of his opponent.3 The oath-formu-
las have the rhythmical quality and alliteration characteristic of
Anglo-Saxon poetry, a trait common in the early laws of the Teu-
tonic nations. Thus in an action to recover a debt'the plaintiff
would say, "In the name of the living God, as I money demand,
so have I lack of that which B promised me when I mine to him
sold." The defendant would meet this accusation by a denial
of its truth- "In the name of the living God, I owe not-to A scatt
or shilling, or penny or penny's worth; but I have discharged him
to all that I owed him, so far as our verbal contracts wdre at
first." 4 As a rule-the only answer open to the defendant wasa
flat denial, a downright no (thwertutnay), and when in later law
other defences were permitted to be pleaded they were still
prefaced by words of denial, the formal "defence" which in some
jurisdictions still constitutes the introductory phrase of the de-
fendant's plea. 5
'Stephen on Pleading, (9 Ed.) i25.
'2 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. 599; 2 Holdsworth, Hist. ic3.
Bigelow, History of Procedure 246. "A punctilious regard for formali-
ties is required of the swearer. If a wrong word is used, the oath 'bursts'
and the adversary wins. In the twelfth century such elaborate forms of
asservation had been devised that, rather than attempt them, men would take
their chance at the hot iron." 2 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. 598.
"Thorpe, Ancient Laws. Vol. 1, p. 183.
'2 Pollock & Maitland, list. 6o&; 2 Holdsworth, Hist. 94; Gould on
Pleading (Will's Ed.) 593; 3 Blackstone, Comm. 296.
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There was never any sudden change'-from the ancient to the
modern formuke; "a gradual progress from the one to the other
may be traced from the pre-Norman through the Norman period
to the time of Edward the First, when the modern forms of
action may be considered to have assumed their definite shape." 6
The chief modifying influences were the employment of profes-
sional lawyers as pleaders and the introduction and development
of trial by jury. Indeed it was largely on account of the peculiar
characteristics of the jury trial that common law pleading de-
veloped as it did and survived to our own day. By the time of
Bracton 7 the defendant was permitted, under the influence of the
Romano-canonical procedure, to offer exceptions which before
long developed into the dilatory pleas and special pleas in bar of
the common law; but the manner of pleading was very imperfect
and the pleaders were frequently guilty of faults that would have
shocked their successors. Argumentativeness and duplicity were
common errors, but the rule that confines a party to a single
plea appears already in Bracton. From the reign of Edward I
the year books contain many cases on pleading which show that
the rules were constantly growing stricter and more technical.
It was, however, during the last twenty years of the reign of
Henry V and the reign of Edward IV that the art was brought
to perfection; it was the fashionable study s and the chief subject
of debate in the reports. "Almost everything substantial in
pleading," says Reeves, "which was practiced from this time
down to the present was settled by judicial determinations in the
reigns of these kings. The precedents of this period became ever
after the standards of good pleading, and the rules and maxims
of pleading now settled, have governed ever since in our courts."
'Bigelow, History of Procedure, 247.
'Bracton x87-b; Stephen on Pleading (9 Ed.), appendix note 35; 2 Pol-
lock & Maitland, I-ist. 613.
z Littleton says: "And know my son, that it is one of the most honorable
laudable and profitable things in our law, to have the science of good plead-
ing in actions real and personal; and, therefore, I counsel you especially to em-
ploy your courage and care to learn this." Litt. Ten, Sec. 534.
93 Reeves' History of English Law (Finlason's Ed.), 578, 6-v. The only
important change until the eighteenth century was the statute of 27 Eliz.
Ch. 5. Sec. i, which provided that defects in form could be taken advantage
of only on special demurrer.
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But the same learned author adds:
"It cannot be denied that the pleaders of these times give in
to much refinement, raising debates about verbal formalities as
toints of the greatest moment; and'such was the humor of the age
that this captiousness was not discountenanced by the bench. When
the philosophy of the times was a war of words, it is not to be won-
dered that a learned profession should pay too great a regard to la-
borious trifles. The calamity has been that after other branches of
knowledge took a more liberal turn, the minutiae of pleading con-
tinued still to be respected with a sort of religious deference."
The reason that common law pleading continued to differ so
widely from other systems will probably be found in the manner
in which the old conception of a trial was adapted to the jury
system. Under the former the altercations of the parties led
up to one of the ancient methods of proof.
"The jury became almost the only mode of proof at a time
when these old ideas were still prevalent; and consequently the jury
was regarded as settling the matter in the same final and unscrutable
manner as compurgation, battle or ordeal. Just as in the older
law, all these rules must be put in motion and strictly obeyed by the
parties at their own risk, so now the parties must put in motion the
complicated machinery of process, and define by their own pleadings
with painful and literal accuracy the issue to be tried." O
The pleadings were oral and delivered either by the party him-
self or his advocate, and many of the fundamental rules of the
art grew out of this method of settling the issue by a discussion
at the bar under the superintendence of the court. The most
casual inspection of the year books will show that this led to
greater freedom in the development of a theory of the case
than prevailed in later times. Suggested pleas were, after a
brief discussion, found inadvisable, a demurrer was suggested and
withdrawn, counsel felt their way toward an issue that each
could accept. Wrhen this was agreed upon the proceedings were
entered by an official on a parchment roll, called the record. From
time to time additional minutes of the remaining incidents of the
103 Holdswortb, Hist. 474.
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cause were added and, when complete the record was preserved
as a perpetual memorial of the transactions which it comprised.
The order of pleading at common law was as follows:
NWhen the parties had appeared, the plaintiff stated his case in
-the first pleading called the declaration (count, tale, narratio).
To this the defendant could either demur or plead. A demurrer
admitted the facts, for purposes of argument, and contended that
the declaration was insitfficient to constitute a cause of action.
Of pleas there were several kinds the most important being dila-
tory pleas and pleas in bar. Dilatory pleas were those which
offered a temporary objection to the proceedings without dis-
cussing the merits of the case, such as pleas to the jurisdiction of
the court, or pleas in abatement, attacking the regularity of the
writ or declaration or settling up the disability of one of the
parties. Pleas in bar went to the merits of the case. They might
be in the form of a traverse, which was a denial of the truth of
the opponent's allegations in whole or part, or in confession and
avoidance, that is admitting the facts charged but setting up new
facts, either by way of discharge or in excuse, or justification,
in avoidance of liability. The plaintiff might then demur to the
plea, as insufficient in law, or answer it by a traverse or in con-
fession and avoidance in what was called the replication. in the
same manner the subsequent pleadings were conducted (rejoinder,
surrejoinder, rebutter, surrebutter), until the parties arrived at
an issue of law or fact. The issue when" reached was formally
tendered and accepted; if of law it was decided by the court, if
of fact by a jury. The system looks reasonable, but was dis-
torted by curious sophistries and fictions, characteristic of medie-
val peda-ntry, intended to entangle one's adversary in an issue of
law and so take the case from the jury-the "lay gents" as they
were called. As to when and how the change took place from
oral to written pleading little that is certain is known; the state-
ments of the historians are conjectures merely." No doubt as the
Gilbert, Origins of the King's. Bench 315; 3 Reeves, History (Finlason
Ed.) 293; 3 Holdsworth, Hist 487. The latter cites Y. B. 38 Hen. VI, 31 pL
13, as the first reference to a paper pleading he has discovered.
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rules of pleading became more formal and technical verbal plead-
ing became increasingly difficult. It is believed that the practice
was adopted of making a tentative entry of the pleadings on the
-roll in advance of arguments. As this method of proceeding was
attended with some difficulties the system was changed, not later
than the reign of Elizabeth so that written memoranda of the
pleadings were prepared and exchanged by the attorneys for the
parties and later transcribed to the parchment roll. The change
seems to be coincident with the growing practice of proving by
witnesses the facts stated in the pleadings, which tended to shift
from counsel the responsibility for the truth of pleas offered by
him. In time the art of pleading separated itself from the art
of advocacy. The attorney obtained the facts from his client and
prepared the pleadings in consultation with an expert called a
special pleader, while the serjeant or barrister conducted the case
in court, arguing the issues of law or trying the issues of fact be-
fore the jury.
"It is difficult," says I-oldsworth, "to give the right weight
both to the deductions of logical reasoning and to the incoher-
ence of facts-to be logical without becoming a slave to logical
abstractions." 12 The theory of pleading was that every dispute
between man and man might, when resolved into its elements, be
shown to spring from a single point of fact or law as to which
the parties were at variance. Human relations are not s6 simple
as this, particularly ii- a developed commercial community. In
a modern lawsuit based on complicated transactions, the ritual of
the single issue could not be performed without excluding from
the case elements necessary to do complete justice. The first di-
vergence from theory came at an early date when the plaintiff was
permitted to join in one suit several distinct causes of action of
the same nature by several counts in one declaration.1" This
practice was so extended that it became usual, particularly in as-
sumpsit and actions on the case, to set forth the plaintiff's single
- 2 Holdsworth, Hist 500.
"Buckmcre's Case, 8 Coke ',&a (j6o09); Comyn's Digest, Actions (G);
Bacon's Abridgement, Pleas B-3; Gould on Pleading (Will's Ed.) 393.
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cause of action in various shapes in different-counts, so that if he
failed in the proof of one count he might succeed on another.
14
The next deviation occurred in 1705 when it was enacted that
the defendant, with leave of court, might plead as many several
matters as he thought necessary for his defence," thus creating
as many issues in a suit as there were pleas filed. After the
passage of this act the multiplication of counts and pleas became
an unmixed evil; the cost of litigation increased and-the case was
presented to judge and jury in a complex form productive of con-
fusion and mistrials. 6 Another source of inconvenience was the
enlargment of the scope of the general issue, a summary form
of general denial of the allegations in the declaration. Form-
erly pleaders had avoided the general issue, but in the eighteenth
century a movement set in,-particularly in actions of assumpsit
and on the case, by which special matter was allowed to be given
in evidence on the trial under the general issue. Consisting of a
mere summary denial and giving no notice of the nature of the
defence the effect was to send the whole case to trial without dis-
tinguishing fact from law and without defining the exact ques-
tion to be tried. The result was that the parties were obliged to
prepare for the proof of every conceivable fact that might bear on
the case, resulting in an unnecessary accumulation of proof and,
consequently, of expense. The judge also was, in the haste of
the trial, compelled to extract from the testimony the questions of-
law and fact for presentation to the jury. The result was that
what was seemingly gained through simplicity of pleading was
lost through the confusion resulting from trials without well-
defined issues, and mbtions for new trials multiplied in conse-
quence.1 T7.
"I Chitty on Pleading (7 Ed.) 424; 3P lackstone's Commentaries -95.
"'Act of 4 Anne, Cl. x6, Sec. 4.
" G. W. Pepper, Article on Pleading in Amer. & Eng. Enc. of Law (I
Ed.), Vol. i8, p. 476.
" See extract from report of Common Law Commissioners printed in
Stephen on Pleading (9 Ed.) ; appendix, p. 61. In America general pleading
was more freely used than special pleading. To meet the objection that it
failed to disclose the matter in dispute the expedient was adopted of requir-
ing the plaintiff to furnish a bill of particulars of his demand and the de-
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Such was the state of pleading both in England and the
United States during the opening years of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In both countries it was the subject of much adverse criti-
cism but was stoutly defended by bench and bar. In the Amer-
ican colonies there were few lawyers at first and justice was ad-
ministered with little formality, but during the course of the
eighteenth century, educated lawyers came to the provinces while
many American students went to London to study in the Inns of
Court.18 As a result *trained lawyers after the Revolution were
devotedly attached to the common law, including its procedure;
while the intense hostility to the legal profession that prevailed
among the people placed the bar on the defensive and made it
the jealous guardian of the bad as well as the good features of
the old system. On both sides of the Atlantic, nevertheless, the
complaints against the prolixity, obscurity and triviality of com-
mon law pleading became louder; the demand for reform more
and more insistent. In England, beginning in 1828, parliament
appointed a series of commissions to inquire into the law of pro-
cedure whose recommendations, which fell far short of the sug-
gestions made, f6und expression in the Rules of Court of Hilary
Term, 1834. The chief aim of these rules was to remedy inci-
dental defects in the-existing system, principally in restricting
the scope of the general issue; their tendency, therefore, was to
strengthen the common law system, and their interpretation at the
hands of a very able group of judges represents the highest de-
velopment of-this difficult art. As a compromise they fell short
of the needs of the time -and were to a large extent supplied by
the Common Law Procedure Acts, a series of laws enacted be-
tween 1852 and 186o.19 These- statutes abolished much of the
old verbiage, as well as special demurrers, and made other val-
uable changes, but were soon superseded by the Judicature Act
of 1873, which, with its amendments and the rules of court
fendant to give notice of the special matters of defense he intended to offer
under the general issue.
" Warren's History of American Bar, Chaps. I, 3 and io.
" Hepburn, Development of Code Pleading 1721.
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adopted in pursuance of its provisions, revolutionized English
procedure. By this legislation the courts were reorganized, pro-
vision made for the concurrent administration of law and equity,
the old forms of distinct actions abolished, and the pleadings fur-
ther simplified. A statement of claim is substituted for the de&-
laration and the bill in equity; a defense for the plea; a reply for
the'replication. After the reply no pleading is permitted without
leave of court.20 The most important innovation is the delega-
tion to the courts of the power to alter and annul the rules of
proedure and make new rules as experience and changing con-
ditions require, giving greater flexibility to procedttre than is pos-
sible under direct legislation. 2'
In the United States, New York was the first state to de-
stroy the old procedure. A commission appointed by the legis-
lature in pursuance of a requirement of the constitution of 1846
reported the draft of a code of procedure which, in spite of great
opposition, was adopted in 1848. - This code abolished the dis-
tinction between proceedings at law and in equity, adopted a
single form of action for the enforcement of all private rights.
abolished common law pleading, and provided for the joinder of
all parties necessary for the complete determination of the contro-
versy. A new system of pleading was introduced which com-
bined some of the features of pleading at law with that in equity.
The first pleading of the plaintiff, was the complaint, a concise
statement of the cause of action with a demand for judgment.
To this the defendant could demur for a limited number of sub-
stantial reasons. The answer might contain either a specific denial
of each material allegation of the complaint or a statement of
new matter constituting a defence or a counter claim. To the
answer, the plaintiff could demur or, if it set up a counter claim
reply. 22 The new system was at first regarded with considerable
"Rules of. Supreme Court, Orders 20, 21, 23; Annual Practice (1917),
37r, 375, 419.
"Rosenbaum, Rule Making Authority.
' In some of the code states no reply is allowed. Gould on Pleading
(Will's Ed.) 89, note.
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hostility by bench and bar, was interpreted frequently in a nar-
row spirit and subjected to much amendatory legislation. In 1876
a new code was adopted called the "Code of Civil Procedure"
which has met with almost universal disapprobation on account
of its vast size and meticulous attention to the most trifling de-
tails of procedure. By the Civil Practice Act of 1920 many minor
and some substantial changes in practice are introduced, including
the abolition of the demurrer.2
The New York Code of 1848 had an immediate and ex-
tensive influence upon American procedure. Within five years
seven states adopted similar codes -;24 and at the present time
more than one-half of the states have codes that either re-enact
the New York Code in substance, or embody so many of its prin-
ciples that they may for all practical purposes be said to adhere
to code pleading. Other states, without following New York,
have by statute remodelled and simplified their procedure, 25
while still others follow the common'law system with minor
changes. The states may roughly be divided into three classes:
code states, common law states, and states having individual stat-
utory systems. It is generally agreed that code procedure in the
United States, no matter how well intended, is crude and im-
perfect, perpetuates many of the faults of the old system, and
lacks simplicity and flexibility. A new movement for procedural
reform has started which cannot fail to have important results.20
The general tendency of expert opinion at this time is in favor of
the abandonment of the complete practice code enacted by the
legislature in favor of a brief practice act dealing only with
main outline and general principles of procedure, leaving the de-
tails to be settled, developed and improved by rules of court. 27
I Act of May 21, i92o, I.a.ws 9-20_o, Chap. 925, taking effect April I5, 192L
^'Missouri, California, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Indiana and Ohio.
For example, Massachusetts, Rev. Laws, Ch. x67, ef seq.; Pennsylvania.
Practice Act of 1915, P. L 483.-
See publications of American Judicature Society.
Such is the plan of the ".ew Jersey Practice Act of i912, Laws, p. 37.
Equity pleading and practice in the Federal Courts, and in Pennsylvania is
prescribed by rule of court.
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Dean Pound 28 has shown that the first principle which those
who frame a practice act should have in view "should be to make
it unprofitable to raise questions of procedure for any purpose
except to develop the merits of the case in full." A prime factor
in achieving this result will be to "distinguish between rules in-
tended to secure the orderly dispatch of business" and rules "in-
tended to protect the substantial rights of the parties." Rulings
of the former class should be open to attack only for abuse of
discretion and nothing should be obtainable through the latter
class except a full and fair opportunity to present the case. The
court should try the case, not the record, and pleadings should
exist not to furnish a necessary formal basis for the judgment,
but solely to give notice to the respective parties of the claims,
defenses and cross-demands of their adversaries. Order is as in-
dispensable in the administration of justice as in any other form
of human activity; law without forms and rules is neither prac-
ticable or desirable. But forms tend to become artificial, rules
mechanical, as the situation that brought about their adoption
changes and new problems arise to which they do not apply. A
perfect system is not within the realm of probability. What can
be done is. to shake off a superstitious regard for forms and apply
common sense to such problems as they arise, remembering that
the more the courts and counsel are relieved from constant at-
tention to petty points of procedure the more time they will have
to devote to the serious cohsideration of the substantial rights of
the parties.
Win. H. Lloyd.
University of Pennsylvania.
'Practical Program "of Procedural Reform, 22 Green Bag 438.
